

NATO for a New Century

Atlanticism and European Security

Edited by Carl C. Hodge

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Humanistic Perspectives on International Relations

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CHAPTER 2

NATO Enlargement and Geostrategic History: Alliances and the Question of War or Peace

Hall Gardner

The decision to enlarge the Atlantic Alliance has opened debate as to whether an expanded alliance will help to sustain global peace or provoke greater tension, if not regional or global wars. International relations theorists are largely divided over the question, and the relationship between alliance enlargement and the question of war or peace is unclear and ambiguous.

Alliances in general have often been blamed as one of the major factors helping to generate the fears and suspicions leading to World War I, as well as previous wars in European history, at least since the advent of the formal multipolar “balance of power” system in the mid-seventeenth century. American foreign policy from George Washington to World War II traditionally eschewed “entangling alliances.” On the other hand, the lack of strong alliances and of firm American commitments to Britain, France, and to key strategically positioned states such as Poland, for example, has been cited as one of the causes of World War II.

Following Soviet retrenchment from eastern Europe after 1989, and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet state in 1991, the Atlantic Alliance has been praised as the most successful alliance in history. Without NATO, it is argued, the peace of Europe could not have been secured throughout the Cold War. Detractors, however, have argued that NATO’s formation in 1949 led to the counterformation of the 1950 Sino-Soviet alliance—and indirectly to the Korean War—in addition to the establishment of the Warsaw Pact following West Germany’s admission to NATO in 1955.

These contrasting perspectives do not clarify the relationship between alliances and war in today’s geostrategic circumstances. The question remains as to whether German unification, followed by Soviet implosion, and now by NATO enlargement into east-central Europe, will prove stabilizing. The Alliance has opted to extend its membership to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary within the

former Soviet sphere of influence, raising some fears of a new partition of Europe. At the same time, NATO has promised to consider further enlarging its membership; it has advocated what has been deemed an "open NATO"—in part to prevent a possible new partition between members and nonmembers. Alliance pronouncements promised that Romania and Slovenia would be granted first consideration in a second round, in addition to one or more of the Baltic states. Indeed, NATO has not left out the possibility of Russian membership, but has only taken limited steps in this direction.¹

To uncover a possible answer to the question as to whether an extended NATO alliance will prove stabilizing, I seek to explicate the views of international relations theorist, George Liska. Even though he was well known in the 1960s for his classic definition of alliances, Liska's later comparative geohistorical perspective of the 1970s and 1980s has often been overlooked or not fully appreciated.² Although generally pessimistic, Liska argues that major power or systemic war is not inevitable and can be averted, yet only given a long-term strategy of *co-optation* of potential rivals into the interstate system. For Liska, alliances are neither inherently stabilizing or destabilizing. Like armaments, they do not *in themselves* cause war, but they can set the preconditions for generalized conflict depending on the manner and circumstances in which they are formed and depending on which *specific* states are included. Moreover, the expansion of an alliance formation is less likely to provoke major power war when the predominant states of a particular historical period are either overtly or tacitly included. Generalized wars, however, are more likely to occur when the predominant powers cannot participate in the key decision-making processes that affect their perceived vital interests, and thus cannot formulate truly *concerted* policies.

Global conflict has largely stemmed from the apparently recurrent failures of the major contending states to forge long-term entente, or full-fledged alliance, relationships. This chapter applies Liska's general theory of alliances and war causation to the comparative origins of classical and modern conflicts. It then concludes with analysis of the potential global ramifications of NATO enlargement from a geohistorical perspective. It is argued that in contemporary circumstances NATO enlargement following the collapse of an overextended Soviet empire—in Liska's definition an "unavoidable alliance"—may not necessarily prove war provoking, but *only* if it is given a very "different implementation."³

A THEORY OF ALLIANCES

Liska's work is dedicated to the study of geohistorical processes and the nature of power as it manifests itself in the rise and decline of states and empires. His view of history as "evolutionary progression short of progress"⁴ represents a powerful critique of modernism. Yet Liska is not content to theorize in the abstract. Theory is largely meaningless unless it serves to illuminate the present and the future. In particular, it should help to guide contemporary policy analysis and practice. It is in this latter spirit that this chapter critiques the American-led effort

to enlarge NATO—what has been dubbed from one quarter as “a policy error of historic proportions”⁵—in comparative geohistorical and systemic terms.

International politics must be understood at the systemic level, according to the geohistorical forces and constraints that drive states to behave in generally recurrent and predictable ways despite frequent changes in leadership. More specifically, the foreign and domestic policies of individual states cannot be understood without reference to the geohistorically conditioned international framework in which a number of key states interact within a dynamic equilibrium of perceived power capabilities, political intent, and international norms. The strategic options and choices of states and empires are preconditioned by their own historical evolution and their specific geostrategic and political-economic positioning within the international system. The nature of any particular global system is meanwhile conditioned by the number and the relationship of rising and declining powers, the nature of often-recurrent tensions, conflicts, and schisms, as well as of any alliances formed. In general, states seek to extend or at least sustain their relative power capabilities and status in the global system. Powers in relative decline may initially retract so as to reestablish their power and status at later dates. They do so by utilizing both intrinsic and extrinsic forms of *strategic leveraging*,⁶ intrinsically, for example, through the buildup of domestic military, technological, and/or economic capabilities, extrinsically through the formation of alliances.

“Alliances,” as Liska put it, “are against, and only derivatively for, someone or something.”⁷ They help to direct the military, technological, economic, and sociocultural capabilities and attributes of a particular state to the purposes of a larger collective body. Alliances may also be formed in an effort to prevent states from conflicting among themselves and thus to *channel* the respective energies and interests of states toward positive collective goals. Alliances can thus provide stability and protection, ameliorate intra-alliance disputes and tensions, seek to reduce collective costs, and provide predictability for investment, if not serve to open markets. On the other hand, they can seek to deny those very capabilities and attributes to third parties, if not to preclude rival states or alliances from seeking to influence strategically important states or regions. Alliance formations may attempt to prevent third parties from playing upon disputes and tensions within the alliance itself, so as to disrupt positive allied relations. Accordingly, they direct their collective energy *against* a third power—either to deter or coerce—but may do so in such a way that can distort the positive political-economic and military capabilities of the alliance itself.

Alliances can act as a shield behind which their individual members can either engage in bargaining with a third party or assert their own regional or global interests without fear of attack—unless they are properly “double contained”⁸ by a major ally with or without the assistance of third powers. In bipolar geopolitical configurations, each major alliance attempts to check the influence of its major rival. At the same time, the major rivals may seek to restrain or “double contain” their respective allies, possibly in tacit cooperation.

In looser, more multipolar geopolitical constellations, by contrast, a number of differing or overlapping alliances may be formed in response to perceived threats from a variety of significant states. A defensive buildup to a perceived threat from one state may unexpectedly cause a counterreaction in a third state, which may perceive the buildup as a threat to its own security. In a multipolar setting, the effort to “double contain” respective allies becomes a more difficult task, particularly if power is more evenly distributed and individual states can more easily play a number of states or alliances against another. If, however, the major rivals are able to forge a truly concerted relationship, then the effort to “double contain” lesser regional powers becomes more readily achievable.

In both bipolar and multipolar systems, crises and conflict can result from the push-pull relationship between major and minor power interests as they clash with those of rival states and their alliance networks. An “automatic” alliance commitment—such as that at least *promised* by NATO’s Article V security commitment, for example—may make it more difficult to restrain an ally from provocative actions. Alliances that involve a more *conditional* commitment make it easier to restrain recalcitrant allies. The interwar Locarno Treaty of 1925 sought to restrain allied demands by treating concerned states as potential adversaries. Such a conditional alliance thus represents an effort to play the interests of potential adversaries against each other by threatening to oppose whichever state initiated the aggression.⁹

In order to assess the merit of a prospective alliance alignment, a state leadership weighs the balance of gains and losses, of protection versus potential provocation, and of the possibility of status enhancement versus possible losses in the capacity for independent action. There is a tendency among alliances for internal strains to increase among winning coalitions of states. There is also a tendency “for the marginal utility of any additional ally or alliance effort, including commitment, to start declining at some point so that liabilities come eventually to exceed the gains to be derived from ostensible increases.”¹⁰ Another problem is that the decision to join an alliance “must be compared with the hypothetical gains and liabilities of other alignments; with non-alignments; or at least with a *different implementation of an unavoidable alliance.*”¹¹ The choice to join or expand an alliance could thus prove to be counterproductive, provoking counterreactions and counteralliances. It can, ironically, result in a breakdown of the cohesion of the winning coalition.

The geohistorical situation of a particular state elite and its relationship with international society informs its world outlook. Its perception of international reality consequently affects a particular elite’s outlook on the necessary conditions of security, status, and relations with third states, which in turn define the nature of national interest and the so-called “balance of power” itself. Divergent perceptions often inhibit the emergence of consensus over basic procedures and norms, and frustrate the search for *parity* among contending powers. Equally, varying perceptions of a state’s ultimate geopolitical intent, as well as its actual

capability to achieve its apparent goals, raise essential questions as to whether one's rival is striving for *parity* or *predominance*.

Both Imperial Germany and the Soviet Union, for example, strove for *parity* with Great Britain and the United States, respectively. They did so precisely in order to *impel* the latter states into an entente or an alliance. Yet the quest backfired in both cases, as Great Britain before World War I and the United States during the Cold War interpreted Imperial German and Soviet actions as striving for superiority, particularly in regard to German naval armaments and Soviet nuclear and conventional arms.

The concepts of "parity" and of "balance of power" have become the basis of myth or ideology utilized by state leaderships to rationalize actions and alliance formations. At the same time, these concepts nonetheless continue to guide analysis, action, and outcome, for better or for worse.¹² The concept of the balance of power is inadequate, as it cannot fully explain either the actual or the potential changing power relationships among states; in addition, both concepts fail to provide a sound basis for policy decision making. States generally act in their own national interests—or more specifically in those interests determined by the elite in power—and they very rarely act to restore the so-called balance of power. This is true in part because the nature of power is always *relative* and can never be reliably quantified. Moreover, there can never be a perfect "balance" among states of differing political-economic power capabilities, sociocultural resiliency, and geostrategic positioning.

The formation of alliances serves only as a partial remedy to counter inequities inherent in the global system. Alliances may help sustain a semblance of a balance of power, but they can also generate fears of isolation and "encirclement" as they work to strengthen their power capabilities, resulting in a potential backlash by rival states. Moreover, as not all alliances materialize at the time when they are absolutely needed, challenging states may still attempt to threaten or attack a prospective member of a rival alliance in order to snap the bonds of loyalty between ostensible allies.

The schism between insular and continental states and empires, which helps to shape divergent national interests if not a state's general *Weltanschauung* itself, represents a recurrent theme of international geohistorical rivalry. There has been an essentially repetitive contest between the national and international geostrategic interests of insular and continental states. This contest is often exacerbated by the movement of continental states toward amphibious status—and since World War II increasingly toward land, sea, and air status. It is also brought about by the collapse of amphibious powers, or by the rise of third powers challenging the system's hierarchical structure and consequently creating fissures and shifts in the global equipoise. Land-sea contests followed the breakup of the Habsburg Empire and the Thirty Years War; the same was true of the Peloponnesian and Punic wars.

Rising powers challenge preeminent states in relative decline, thus upsetting the global system and forcing the dominant and regional systems to readjust. If

states are not resilient enough to readjust or cannot form new alliances that restabilize their circumstance—or if elites refuse to accept significant changes in their relative power status—the possibility for retrogressive systemic conflict, often accompanied by revolution in less resilient states, rises in proportion to the resistance to change. In particular, a state in decline yet still capable of obstruction, if not resurgence, presents a key dilemma for statecraft. Political leadership can either forge an adversarial relationship and alliance against such a state, or it can engage in a more cooperative, integrative form of containment that seeks to direct an actually or potentially obstructive state toward more positive behavior.

An essentially adversarial relationship was sustained against France after the Seven Years' War, and against Germany after both the Franco-Prussian War and World War I, for example. Each situation produced a major power war two to four decades later. An integrative approach, however, was pursued in regard to France after the War of the Spanish Succession and again after the Napoleonic wars, as well as for Germany and Japan after World War II. The strategy was not entirely successful in the eighteenth century, in that France ultimately became a major revisionist by 1756. It did nonetheless restrain France from again becoming a major threat in the nineteenth century, despite Louis Napoleon's efforts to assert France's Eurasian interests in the Crimean War. Thus far, an integrative approach appears successful in the cases of Germany and Japan after World War II, insofar as neither has attempted to rise again as a military power.

Liska compares the rise and fall of predominant states and empires within entirely different historical epochs. Although historical analogy has often provided a basis for responsible decision making by policy makers, he cautions that any analogy be thought through. Unless *both* significant similarities *and* significant differences are brought out, historical analogy can be misleading and may be utilized inappropriately as a model for understanding contemporary issues or for choosing between policy options. By focusing on the range of strategic choices and possibilities that may be explored, Liska engages the often conflicting debates behind policy decisions that are generally obscured in the banal positivism of so-called "objective" analysis. In the Machiavellian dialectic between virtue and necessity, there is always a range of strategic options available to the states, even when domestic or international constraints appear to preclude them. Openings and opportunities in the relationships among states can break traditional cycles of behavior—and of war—if the appropriate moment is properly seized by enlightened leadership.

There is no necessity for the U.S.–Soviet Cold War to be followed by a renewed conflict between the United States and Russia. But a round of Russian *revanchism* cannot be ruled out. The historical record suggests that previous cold wars, as well as wars of *initial challenge*, are often followed by wars of revenge. This was the case in the Ionian phase of the Peloponnesian wars; Hannibal's revenge of the Second Punic War; as well as during the Thirty Years War in the case of the Spanish Duke of Olivares, who sought to restore Spanish control of

the Netherlands and Catholic supremacy in Europe. By the late eighteenth century, France sought to restore and expand its empire under Napoleon, as did Germany under Hitler. In contemporary circumstance, the problem is to formulate a geostrategy leading to an appropriate reequilibration of relative power and reintegrating Russia and other strategically significant powers into a larger global concert. Such a strategy would seek to reduce the chances of systemic conflict, even though limited internal or regional wars may persist.

ALLIANCE, WAR, AND THE CLASSIC LAND-SEA SCHISM

Since 1991 the world has seen a new opportunities, but the weight of the millennial past continues to burden the present. The Peloponnesian and Punic wars represent two classical accounts of bimultipolar, insular/continental schisms, with significant parallels and differences to the U.S.-Soviet/Russian rivalry. This is true despite the fact that the Athenian-Spartan conflict within the Greek city-state system really represented a microcosm within a larger Mediterranean equilibrium, whereas Rome and Carthage represented the two predominant actors of the Mediterranean world of that time. The outbreak of both these cycles of wars indicates how expanding power capabilities and shifting alliances, coupled with the breakdown of previous overt or tacit understandings among the principal rivals, can result in deadly recurrent contests for predominance.

The outbreak of Peloponnesian wars was preceded by an Athenian-Spartan cold war. The latter essentially began in 477 B.C. with the formation of the Delian League prior to the outbreak of the first phase of a hot war in 460/457 B.C., once Megara defected from the Spartan League. A hot war began after the Athenian decision in 462/461 B.C. to drop its disintegrating ties with Sparta once the new Athenian "democratic" leadership under Pericles had expelled the "pro-Spartan" leader Cimon, and following the construction of the "long walls" of defense that could help to shield an Athenian offensive.

The second phase of the Peloponnesian conflict, the Archidamian War, began in 431 B.C., following the rivalry between the pivotal state of Corcyra with Spartan-ally Corinth. The war was a result of three interrelated factors: the Athenian quarantine of Megara intended to check Corinthian influence; Athenian penetration of Spartan and Corinthian spheres of influence, such as the colonization of Amphipolis, strategically positioned near Potidaea; and the formation of an encircling alliance with Sparta's archrival, the continental flanking state of Argos, an action that further damaged Athenian-Corinthian relations and that was subsequently countered by a Spartan alliance with Thebes.

Having previously established hegemony over the Aegean, Athens sought a unique defensive pact with Corcyra, for fear of losing the latter's naval capabilities. The pact was to provide Athens with a controlling position over the Ionian Gulf, threatening Spartan spheres of security and influence. Thucydides argues that the growth in the power of Athens and the alarm it inspired in Sparta made war "inevitable." His analysis raises the question as to what would have been the

consequence had Athens more systematically sought to sustain a tacit Athenian-Spartan double containment over the key pivotal powers, Corinth and Corcyra.

Although the U.S.-Soviet wartime alliance against Germany, 1941–1945, collapsed after World War II, the superpowers were by contrast able to maintain a general state of peace, though not without intense regional conflicts often fought through surrogates. The ensuing struggle for control of former German spheres of influence, the quarantine of East Germany and other Soviet-bloc states, the formation of NATO, Soviet/Russian fears of a U.S./NATO alliance with the flanking states of Japan and the People's Republic of China, collectively resemble the 477 to 461 B.C. phase of Athenian-Spartan relations, following the breakdown of their alignment against Persia. Throughout the Cold War, Washington and Moscow sustained a tacit multidimensional "double containment" of Germany and Japan, as well as other significant regional powers, including China, that helped to prevent open conflict between them. Yet it is *precisely the Soviet/Russian role in this multidimensional double containment that has virtually disappeared following German unification.*¹³

The collapse of the Soviet Empire and its spheres of security parallel the instability that confronted Sparta. Continuing fears of national uprisings and Russian disaggregation, coupled with recurrent wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan, recall the threats posed by the Helot revolution and the Third Messenian War. The United States and NATO now bid for control over former Soviet and Russian spheres of influence in Central and Eastern Europe much as Athens penetrated Sparta's sphere in the Aegean and then the Ionian seas. Disputes over power and burden sharing within NATO, considered together with differences over the financing of the 1990 Persian Gulf war and the conduct wars in Bosnia and Kosovo,¹⁴ are reminiscent of Athenian efforts to sustain preeminence over its Delian league allies, regardless of the diminished Persian threat. Moreover, Pericles' decision to forge a new "defensive" alliance with the insular power bears similarities to NATO's decision to extend its alliance with Western Europe into Central Europe, a change depicted as defensive, involving no nuclear weapons or additional troops to be deployed on the territory of new NATO members.

Most crucially, should the United States and Russia not be able to reach a compromise over the question of the modalities of NATO enlargement into East-Central Europe, the two powers risk losing their tacit post-World War II alliance against Germany and Japan altogether. This would parallel the Athenian decision to drop entirely its deteriorating ties with Sparta after the new Athenian democratic leadership expelled Cimon. Moreover, American proposals to build a ballistic missile defense in possible violation of the ABM treaty could be interpreted by Russia in much the same way that Sparta interpreted the Athenian decision to build defensive walls around the city of Athens. In a word, the United States is presently poised either to renew its relations with Moscow or else let them sour to an even greater extent, thus risking another round of mutual imprecations that could degenerate into a wider conflict.

Turning to another episode involving an essentially bipolar land/sea schism, namely the clash between Rome and Carthage over spheres of influence in Spain, Sicily, and the Mediterranean, raises additional questions about Soviet collapse and NATO enlargement. Much as the Peloponnesian wars can be viewed as a result of the breakdown of the Athenian-Spartan wartime alliance, the First Punic War can likewise be interpreted as a product of the termination of the 279-278 B.C. Roman-Carthaginian wartime alliance against Tarentum and Pyrrhus of Epirus. The alliance between Rome and Carthage followed the classic "Pyrrhic victory" at Ausculum that opened Sicily up to Greek conquest. The deterioration of that alliance was provoked by the Roman decision to assist the Mamertines against Syracuse in 264 B.C. and to take Messana under Roman protection. This unexpected action led Carthage to support Syracuse in response. This in turn represented a reversal in alliances equally unanticipated by Rome, as Carthage and Syracuse had traditionally been enemies.¹⁵

Carthage subsequently accused Rome of a violation of its previous agreements, which, according to Carthaginian sources, forbade the Romans to cross into Sicily and the Carthaginians to cross into Roman spheres. In fact, Rome and Carthage did sign three treaties in 510-509, 348, and 306 B.C., designed to sustain Carthagian spheres of influence over Western Sicily, Sardinia, Libya, and the Iberian peninsula, but there was no agreement addressing specifically the changing status of a divided Sicily. The 510-509 B.C. treaty, signed in the year that marks the formation of the Roman Republic, sought to affirm Roman agreement to abide by the historically positive relations between Carthage and Etrusca. In the 306 B.C. treaty, Rome vowed not to cross the Straits of Messina in exchange for a Carthagian concession to permit Rome full liberty of maneuver in the Italian peninsula.¹⁶ Moreover, even if there was no formal treaty in 279-278 B.C., there may have been a tacit understanding involving a vague mutual recognition of respective military and commercial spheres of influence that was at least proposed during the 279-278 B.C. wartime alliance against Pyrrhus.¹⁷ Whether a formal treaty actually existed is really secondary to the point that Carthage at least operated under the assumption that some type of accord existed in order to justify its previous alliance relationship, and it jealously guarded Western Sicily as the central strategic keystone to its insular defense. On the other hand, Roman expansion to Calabria diminished the size of the buffer region between the two states. As an expanding continental power seeking amphibious status, Rome began to regard the Carthagian presence on Sicily as a potential "encirclement." Carthage was regarded as threatening Rome's maritime trade from ports on the Ionian Sea and in the Gulf of Tarante.

The charge that a tacit agreement was violated is not unlike the debate between the United States and Russia, as to whether Washington affirmed absolutely in 1989-1990 that it would not extend NATO into East-Central Europe. Moscow has argued that the decision to enlarge NATO into what it has considered its central strategic region of continental defense contravenes the spirit of the "two plus four" treaty on German unification not to permit NATO forces into the territory

of the former East Germany, as well as the “gentleman’s agreement” made between George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990 against NATO expansion. As a rising land power seeking amphibious status, Rome expanded into Calabria and thereby diminished the historic buffer between Etruscans/Rome and Carthage, a power in relative decline. In contemporary geopolitics, NATO enlargement into former Soviet and historic Russian spheres of influence similarly risks undermining the post-1945 security buffer between the United States and its German ally and a Russia now in a state of near absolute collapse.

THE QUEST FOR PREDOMINANCE AFTER THE THIRTY YEARS WAR

The latter two classical accounts forewarn of tensions that could result from either expanding or shifting alliances and the collapse of buffer regions. The origins of modern wars are just as relevant to the post-Cold War era. According to Liska, the roots of the modern crisis and of the contemporary land-sea schism can be traced to the break-up of the Habsburg Empire. The Thirty Years War, initially sparked by religio-political confrontation in Prague within the Bohemian/German shatterbelt, represented the culmination of an overlapping series of wars involving Dutch independence, all-out war between the French Valois and the Spanish Habsburgs, in addition to Swedish, Danish, Polish, and Russian strife over the Baltic littoral and Eastern Europe. The Thirty Years War and the 1648 Peace of Westphalia established Sweden as a major power and Austria as a separate dynasty and territorial state, while simultaneously opening up a land-sea schism, initially between an independent Holland, backed by Britain, against an amphibious Spain. Westphalia thus worked to formalize a new “balance of power” or equilibrium less charged with religious tensions.

What distinguished the Thirty Years War from the later Seven Years War, World War I, and the Cold War is that the *indecisively defeated* amphibious states of the latter three conflicts—France, Imperial Germany, Soviet Russia—all lost their overseas possessions along with their relative position of power on the European continent and their domestic political-economic stability. France and Germany then prepared wars of *revanche* from a position of relative geopolitical and socio-economic collapse.

By contrast, although Spain did engage in an essentially revanchist phase of warfare during the Thirty Years War and attempted a final resurgence after the War of the Spanish Succession following a series of wars throughout the seventeenth century, Madrid was not forced to give up all of its European or overseas holdings until the Napoleonic wars. Spain thus remained a major power whose drive for power and influence was only gradually snuffed out.

The Thirty Years War not only helped to open the land-sea dichotomy but also helped to further intensify, along with the later sequels of the 1701–1713/14 War of Spanish Succession and of the 1700–1721 Great Northern wars, major power rivalry for control over key geostrategic and geoeconomic regions in the north-

east as well as in central and eastern Europe. From this perspective, the Thirty Years War re-ignited Polish-Ukrainian conflict in the 1648 Ukrainian uprising and ultimately permitted Russia to establish hegemony over Ukraine formalized in the 1654 Pereyaslav Agreement.¹⁸ Russia was then able to seize much of Polish-held Belarus, as well as eastern Ukraine following the 1654–1667 Thirteen Years War.

Swedish efforts to liberate Ukraine and march on Russia failed in the 1709 Battle of Poltava. In addition, following Russian occupation of Poland in 1709, Russian troops forced the return of Augustus II to the throne of Poland. Augustus was also Elector of Saxony and had been deposed by Sweden in 1704 and then replaced by Stanislaus Leszczyński until 1709. With the defeat of Sweden in the Great Northern War, 1700–1721, Russia occupied Mecklenberg in alliance with Poland and Denmark and made a decisive step toward the Baltic, opening the door to the West by 1721. This latter act initiated a cycle of struggle to remove Russia from the Baltic littoral, as well as from Central and Eastern Europe in the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. Offensives by Napoleon I and Hitler ultimately failed; by contrast, Imperial Germany stunned Tsarist Russia at Tannenberg in 1914, and then at Brest-Litovsk in 1915, knocking Russia out of Central and Eastern Europe at the 1917 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk following secret diplomatic and financial support for Lenin. At the same time, each effort to remove Russia from Central and Eastern Europe was countered by Russian efforts to reestablish predominance over the region.

The Thirty Years War did not end France's efforts to assert effective control over all "gates" leading to France and to force Spain to surrender the Burgundian Circle, as well as its Italian possessions and Catalonia. Despite assistance from England in 1657, France was unable to settle its continuing dispute with Spain at the 1659 Peace of the Pyrenees. Louis XIV invaded the Spanish Low countries in 1667 and the Dutch Republic in 1672, inadvertently bringing about that which it sought to avoid. Louis XIV's efforts to break a predictable Spanish-Austrian encirclement in 1688 and to block William of Orange from ousting James II from Great Britain, by means of a limited "preemptive" engagement in Cologne and Philippsburg in the Palatinate, led to the more general Nine Years War of 1688–1697. This involved the formation of a "Grand Alliance" against France, once England and Holland joined the League of Augsburg in 1689. England declared war on France following the French decision to assist James II in Ireland; France was thus unable to prevent an alliance between Britain and Holland despite previous Anglo-Dutch conflict over the slave trade and the American colonies. The Dutch fleet sailed up the Thames in 1667; France and England combined against the Netherlands in 1672 until the 1674 Treaty of Westminster with Britain and then the 1679 Treaty of Nijmegen with France, following the Dutch flooding of the dykes.

The Nine Years War represented a decisive use of sea power and has been called a "world war," because it corresponded with Anglo-French colonial conflicts. It involved a Grand Alliance of the League of Augsburg states—Austria, Sweden,

Spain, plus German shatterbelt states of Bavaria, Saxony, and the Palatinate—joined by England and Holland. France supported the Ottoman Empire against Austria; Poland, Russia, and Venice were also involved. After the 1697 Peace of Ryswick, France relinquished its claims to Cologne, and recognized William of Orange as king of England, but retained Alsace and Strasburg, thereby leaving the door open to Franco-German conflict. Negotiations in the period 1697–1702 failed to settle disputes over the Spanish succession. Backed by German sovereigns, Augustus II was elected ruler of Poland against the interests of France.

The 1701–1713/14 War of the Spanish Succession again involved a Grand Alliance of England, Holland, and Austria against France, in dynastic union with Spain, and more truly represented the first global war as it linked overseas rivalries with conflicts in Dutch littoral and the German Central and Eastern European shatterbelt. The 1713 Peace of Utrecht partially partitioned Spanish holdings in Europe, but left a good deal of Spain's overseas possessions and trade intact. It also gave Britain control of the Mediterranean at Gibraltar, plus a monopoly of the slave trade with Latin America. Still, Britain's designs on parts of Spanish America were frustrated during the war.¹⁹ The Treaty of Utrecht also more formally established the principle of the balance of power than did Westphalia and was followed by the 1716 Anglo-French entente signed after the death of Louis XIV in 1715. The entente was designed to counter efforts by Philip V of Spain to overturn both Utrecht and the 1714 Rastatt peace settlement. It was also forged partly in response to the Russian occupation of Mecklenburg, which bordered Hanover, a province of geostrategic concern to the English Crown. France and England were then joined in 1717 by the United Provinces and then Austria. The United Provinces, however, did not sign the Quadruple Alliance for fear of being deprived of Spanish "most favored nation" status. In 1720, the Quadruple Alliance compelled a revisionist Spain to accept the provisions of the peace treaties at Utrecht and Rastatt.

The Anglo-French entente, lasting roughly fifteen years, represented an effort to reintegrate France after the War of Spanish Succession and to overcome a land-sea schism. It was also designed to contain the ambitions of Austria and Spain. Once the Quadruple Alliance began to break up in 1720–1724, however, the unstable Anglo-French entente unraveled between 1728 and 1731, as Britain secretly reached for an alliance with Austria and secured the Second Treaty of Vienna in 1731. The Vienna treaty was also signed by Spain and the Netherlands, again isolating and encircling France with a new grand alliance. In addition, the death of Augustus II destabilized Poland in 1733. France, Spain, and most of the Polish nobility backed Stanislaus Leszczynski, who had previously ruled Poland in 1704–1709. Russia, Austria, and the Lithuanian nobility backed Augustus III, son of Augustus II. The War of Polish Succession ended with the fourth treaty of Vienna in 1738. But by 1739 the Anglo-Spanish War of Jenkins Ear led to overseas conflict involving both Spain and France. Overseas conflict began to interlock more tightly with Austro-Prussian war over Silesia and the German

shatterbelt in the 1740–1748 War of Austrian Succession, in which England and Austria aligned.

The subsequent Seven Years War was in part sparked by another diplomatic revolution when Austrian Count Kaunitz took steps to align Austria and France, joined by the nascent *pivotal* state, Russia, as well as Saxony and Sweden, against Prussia. Austria no longer saw England as supporting its revanchist claims to Silesia, and Austrian actions were countered by a 1756 British-Prussian convention to protect Hanover. France's efforts to play two games simultaneously—seeking negotiations with England on the one hand, and threatening an alliance with Spain on the other—exacerbated the conflict.²⁰ While supporting Hanover, England increasingly looked to Prussia rather than its traditional Austrian ally to counterbalance France.

Meanwhile, wars overseas interlinked with the contest in Europe and resulted in the loss of French colonies in India and North America after the 1763 Peace of Hubertusberg. France's defeat following the Peace of Paris likewise led to the loss of French influence in Poland and Central Europe, resulting in the further rise of Russian influence in this region, and brought with it domestic instability and mounting debt. The decline of French support for an independent Poland led to the latter's partitioning in 1772 by Austria, Prussia, and Russia, while Russian victories over the Ottoman empire further weakened Poland's position. Poland was again partitioned in 1793 and 1795, in part to take advantage of a temporarily weak France and to contain French revolutionary support for Polish independence but also to assert Russian, Prussian, and Austrian interests.

Following its defeat in the Seven Years War, France sought revenge against Britain, and the American Revolution offered ample opportunity. Foreign Affairs Minister Count de Vergennes tried to maintain the Family Compact with Spain as a means to approximate naval parity with Britain. He also pursued a defensive alliance with Austria to balance Prussia, so as to prevent Britain from using the latter to pressure the Rhine. Shielded by close relations with Spain and Austria, France was then in a position to build up its naval and military capabilities while avoiding direct conflict with Britain, unless the chances for success appeared strong.²¹ Yet French support for the American colonies following their 1777 victory at Saratoga represented a case of failed *revanche*, in that Britain was not substantially weakened by the loss of its American colonies; nor was France otherwise able to capitalize on American independence, as Britain monopolized American trade until the War of 1812. By 1789, France could no longer sustain a relationship of global parity with Britain. Revolution upset Vergennes's system of protective alliances, opening the country's eastern flank to Prussian and Austrian pressures.

France sought to preempt an Austro-Prussian alliance by launching a war intended initially to be limited. Among the contending factions in France the Girondists saw the 1756 alliance with Austria as leading to the downfall of the French empire following French defeat in the Seven Years War. The Girondist

leader, Brissot de Warville, accordingly demanded that his compatriots avenge the crimes of foreign powers and fight for “universal liberty,” attacking the legitimacy of monarchy throughout Europe. As tensions mounted, the Austrian and Prussian rivals signed a military convention in July 1791. Austro-Prussian goals were, on the surface, also limited. They were aimed in part at undermining Russian influence in Poland and mobilizing support for monarchy. The Girondists believed Russia, Sweden, and Britain would remain neutral in a war directed against their Austrian enemy. Prussia, they reasoned, would consequently break its alliance with Austria and leave it isolated.

The war-prone Brissotines believed a limited war would test the loyalty of Louis XVI and help consolidate the gains of the revolution. Lafayette thought that victory over Austria and Prussia might strengthen the new constitution, limiting the power of the monarchy. Ironically, Louis believed that defeat in war might help to restore the throne.²² Despite the efforts by French Foreign Minister Dumouriez to obtain assurances of British, Dutch, Spanish, and Swiss neutrality, the French attack on the Austrian Netherlands and Belgium, the buffer between England and the continental powers, convinced the British parliament to vote for war preparations against France in December 1792. The result was that actions by revolutionary France in pursuit of limited goals sparked a general war in Europe by 1793, twenty-nine years after the collapse of France’s overseas empire.

World War I can be said to have resulted from the failure of Germany to rebuild a close alliance with Britain in the early nineteenth century. Prussia’s humiliations in the first half of the nineteenth century impelled it to enhance its military capacity through German unification in the second half. Success in the 1866 Seven Weeks War squelched the Austrian bid for hegemony over the German principalities, but later resulted in conflict with France and Russia, in part over Poland. Britain attempted to play “balance of power” politics vis-à-vis France, Germany, and Russia. Meanwhile, a united Germany led by Chancellor Otto von Bismarck played its Russian card against Britain through the formation of the shaky Triple Alliance in 1882—linked to Tsarist Russia by means of the 1887 Reinsurance Treaty—intended to prevent Austrian, Italian, and Russian interests from colliding. London and Berlin then failed to sustain the tacit entente relationship established in the 1887 Mediterranean Accords, once France and Russia were able to move toward alliance in 1890–1894.²³ Partly with the help of this latter Dual Alliance following the 1870–1871 Franco-Prussian War, a *revanchist* France sought to regain Alsace-Lorraine, even though Bismarck had cut off this option with the Reinsurance Treaty of 1887.

Subsequent British links to the Dual Alliance exacerbated German fears of “encirclement,” resulting in a strengthening of German naval capabilities in an effort to break the Franco-Russian Dual Alliance and achieve parity with Britain. Contrary to balance of power theory, Britain did not side with the lesser powers against the stronger states. In effect, London sided with the two more powerful naval and land powers, France and Russia, that posed *the greatest threat to its overseas and continental interests at the time*, rather than sustaining its tacit

entente relationship with Germany, Austria, and Italy. Although Italy possessed a significant navy, it constituted no direct challenge to British interests in the Mediterranean. Austria did not directly or indirectly threaten British interests, and Germany would not be perceived as a major power threat until the turn of the century. Equally, however, Britain did not really “bandwagon”²⁴ against Germany so much as it sought to control or *co-opt* the Franco-Russian relationship and channel French and Russian energies so that that these states would not harm British interests or join forces with Germany. Yet by not working to bring France and Germany into a common entente relationship *against* Russia, British diplomacy served to fulfill the most pessimistic prophecies of Germany’s long-term ambitions.

It was only by 1901 that London began to perceive German naval power as a threat of the first order. At the same time, Berlin’s expectation that London would regard Germany’s “risk fleet” as a power factor making Germany worthy of alliance proved illusory. Britain shocked the world by forging an entente with its nineteenth-century Russian rival in 1907, after having forged ententes with France in 1904 and strategic partnerships with the United States and Japan in 1901–1902. Although Britain proclaimed that its new alignments were “defensive” and designed to resolve colonial disputes with each of these powers, London’s efforts were perceived by the German leadership as an effort to preclude close German ties with either France or Russia, or, even worse, to strengthen historical German rivals through the “encirclement” of the Reich. In 1914, Germany opted for a two-front war in support of Austro-Hungarian interests in the Balkans, and against the flanking pressures from France and Russia. While hoping that neither Britain nor the United States would enter the war—the hope of revolutionary France before declaring war on Austria—Germany’s attack on Belgium ensured British entry, as in the case of revolutionary France’s assault on Holland and Belgium.

Only American entry into the war tipped the scales decisively against Germany, and the latter was still able to weaken France substantially and demolish Tsarist Russia through secret support for Lenin’s revolution. The revolution destroyed tsarist control over Poland, the Baltic states, as well as over other states in Central and Eastern Europe, plus Belarus and Ukraine, until Lenin was able to reabsorb most of the latter two states following the Russian Civil War. The Russo-Polish war, 1918–1921, subsequently confirmed Polish independence.

Unlike the Congress of Vienna in which post-Napoleonic France was brought into the Concert of Europe by 1818, defeated Germany was not integrated into a new concert of powers following the Treaty of Versailles. President Wilson’s promises of “open covenants openly arrived at” excluded significant German interests. Moreover, the 1925 Treaty of Locarno guaranteed Weimar Germany’s western borders with France, but did not stabilize its eastern frontier. An eastern version of Locarno never materialized. The belated 1934 plan of French Foreign Minister Jean Louis Barthou to establish one was not adequately supported by either Britain or Poland, and it was opposed by Nazi Germany as “encirclement.”

Following Anglo-French appeasement diplomacy at Munich in 1938—a policy intended to direct Nazi Germany’s ambitions eastward and play them off against the Soviet Union—Germany marched into the Sudetenland, Poland seized Teschen in Czech Silesia, and Hungary annexed southern regions of Slovakia. By August 1939, Hitler sought to play upon intra-West tensions and break the 1935 Franco-Soviet mutual defense pact by establishing a separate deal with Stalin through the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Much like Imperial Germany before him, he was convinced that neither Britain, France, nor the United States would intervene to defend Poland despite the Anglo-French pledge to do so.

POST-COLD WAR EUROPE: RETROGRESSION OR PROGRESS?

In the contemporary context, the outcome of the Cold War has ominous parallels with the collapse of the French Empire following the Seven Years War and Imperial Germany’s collapse following World War I. The latter is true despite the fact that the Cold War produced no direct shooting match typical of previous land-sea schisms since the Thirty Years War. In many ways, U.S. containment policy applied to the Soviet Union achieved the late World War I aims of Imperial Germany without a shot being fired. The breakdown of the Soviet Empire, and the failure of post-Soviet Russia to sustain geostrategic parity with the United States, therefore has its precedent in the collapse of other empires. But the Soviet collapse also presents new opportunities—if the moment is seized and a global strategy formulated.

The contemporary global system, characterized by *highly uneven polycentric power capabilities* and varied distribution of land, sea, air, and space military-technological capabilities, is in some respects similar to the interwar period. Those years featured an *uneven polycentrism* that led to the formation of the Axis and Allied coalitions, in contrast to the essentially multipolar land-sea arms rivalry that characterized the pre-World War I period leading to the Triple entente and the Triple Alliance. Following the Soviet Union’s defeat in the Cold War, a reconstituted Russia plays the role of Weimar Germany, while the United States assumes the role of Great Britain, although the United States today is far more engaged in European security than was the case for interwar Britain. Europe, with unified Germany at its core, plays the role of interwar France as the flanking power to Russia’s west. China plays the role of the interwar Soviet Union as a flanking power to the east. Contemporary Japan cannot be compared with Japan of the interwar period. Rather, it comes closer to Japan as an ally of Britain before World War I. As a land bridge to the Indian Ocean, contemporary India plays a role similar to interwar Italy’s land bridge to the Mediterranean.

The collapse of the Soviet Empire parallels the simultaneous breakup of the Tsarist Russian, Imperial Germany, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires following World War I. Soviet disintegration has resulted in an essentially landlocked Russian Federation, somewhat reminiscent of Russia in the seventeenth

century prior to the absorption of Ukraine or in 1917 prior to Bolshevik victory in the Civil War. This situation has once again opened up Central and Eastern Europe, leaving a shatterbelt stretching from Finland and the Baltic States to the Black Sea and Central Asia—an area of far greater size than the area of potential European theater conflict of the interwar period. Within this shatterbelt, the new NATO members, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, represent the contemporary equivalent to the interwar Little Entente of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania.²⁵ Caught between NATO and Russian pincers, a contemporary, highly unstable Ukraine is the key European pivotal state like Poland in the interwar period. Ukraine can swing either toward NATO, Russia, or, less likely, the People's Republic of China—if not break up territorially. A significant yet accidental parallel is the fact that post-Soviet retrenchment has created a “Baltic corridor” to Kaliningrad, similar to the interwar “Polish corridor” that separated Weimar Germany from East Prussia.

Political instability in Kaliningrad; mutual imprecations among Poland, the Baltic states, Russia, and Belarus; calls to enlarge NATO into the Baltic states, or to an unstable Ukraine—each scenario is rich in geopolitical conflict potential. In addition, the collapse of the Soviet Empire has led to an arrangement between a democratic Russia and a communist China, strategically not unlike the interwar Rapallo agreement between Weimar Germany and the Soviet Union.

For Liska, the factor that prevented the Cold War from becoming a hot one was not so much the advent of nuclear weaponry as a dissuasive factor, but the greater global space in which states have been able to stretch out their geopolitical and political-economic interests without fear of collision with flanking powers. From this perspective, a rising China, which proved to be only fleetingly aligned with the United States in the 1970s, did not prove to be a truly “encircling” continental power during the Cold War. American efforts to play the “China card” did not provoke war but have, to a large extent, backfired against American interests. Neither did mutual apprehension about a rising China bring the United States and Soviet Union into more overt cooperation.

However, had China aligned with the United States, or were to do so at a future date, historic Russian fears of encirclement would be quickened. It is doubtful that the United States would coalesce with China for fear of losing Taiwan and alienating Japan, but the perception in Moscow and Beijing that the Washington might now be able to play one of them against the other power has made a Rapallo-type relationship attractive.

The expansion of NATO into East-Central Europe has further pressed Russia into understandings with China, India, Iraq, and Iran, and other states, as both Moscow and Beijing see the need for cooperation in the Central Asia region and the Persian Gulf.

Moreover, NATO's war in Kosovo had the general effect of bringing Russia, India, and China together into opposition against perceived American support for secessionist movements. Hence, NATO enlargement, coupled with a stronger U.S.–Japanese alliance similar to the 1902 Anglo-Japanese arrangement, could

press Russia and China toward something much more cohesive than the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s.²⁶

Moreover, Beijing's double game—the threat to tilt either toward Russia or the United States—heightens American-Russian competition for China's allegiance. As the key pivotal state, Beijing is capable of playing American, European, Japanese, and Russian interests against each other in pursuit of its own regional claims. Chinese pressure on Taiwan and on Japanese sea lanes of communication to the Persian Gulf, as well as Beijing's threatened support for North Korea, tends in turn to tighten American-Japanese cooperation. In addition to the analogy to the interwar German-Soviet Rapallo agreement, a future Russo-Chinese alliance features some similarities to the French and Austrian alliance forged before the Seven Years War.

Returning to Europe, the two-plus-four treaty leading to German unification in 1990 has similarities with the 1925 Locarno Treaty. Much as the Locarno Treaty guaranteed German territories and demilitarized the Rhineland, the two-plus-four treaty essentially demilitarized eastern Germany, except if the Article VI provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty go into effect. In addition, the United States, like France before World War II, now appears to be dealing with security issues in Central and Eastern Europe that were not addressed early enough in the interwar period, through the formulation of an "Eastern Locarno." At American and German initiative, NATO appears to be formulating a kind of Barthou Plan, which could either move toward closer cooperation with Russia or else raise greater suspicions.²⁷ The Alliance's enlargement into East-Central Europe is intended in part to "double contain" the potential political-economic, military, and foreign policy independence of Germany since its unification, in addition to providing a buffer against possible instability from the East.

These efforts appear on the surface at least²⁸ to take the form of an Eastern Locarno, but it is still not certain whether they will win Russian acceptance in the long term. Despite the formation of the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council, which meets separately from the North Atlantic Council, Moscow's attitude toward NATO enlargement has been jolted by the Kosovo intervention, which threw into question the effectiveness of the Permanent Joint Council. Moscow's attitude may change even more radically once Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary begin to take steps toward *full* integration with NATO's military command, a goal that according to the Pentagon could be achieved around the year 2009, or if one or more of the Baltic states are offered membership. Additionally, as American steps progress toward ballistic missile defense systems without cooperation and engaged planning with Russia, it may also alienate Moscow, resulting in the worst scenario in a defensive strategy of launch-on-warning or nuclear preemption.²⁹ Much as Nazi Germany regarded the 1934 Barthou Plan, Moscow may in the near future not only oppose NATO enlargement but also *any* system of "cooperative" security as a form of encirclement—if *legitimate* Russian security interests are not taken into account and if "reciprocal" or "conjoint" security guarantees cannot soon be formulated.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

An alternative option for U.S. policy would be to take a more concerted approach, involving closer NATO interaction with international regimes, such as the UN and OSCE, and other regional organizations.³⁰ For example, Euro-Atlantic war-preventive forces trained by the Partnership for Peace under the command of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council could be deployed in the Baltic states or other areas of potential conflict in the region. Regional systems of integrated defenses under a general UN or OSCE mandate could be implemented *before* and not *after* conflict erupts, unlike the war in Kosovo. Moreover, the mission of the new “full” members of NATO should be re-defined, so as to enlarge interstate security cooperation throughout Central and Eastern Europe and in cooperation with Russia—a “Euro-Atlantic compromise.”³¹

Accordingly, rather than *fully* integrating Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into NATO’s command, the Alliance should consider the formation of a “separate but not separable”³² Euro-Atlantic Defense and Security Identity that brings in most eastern European states, including Russia. The latter, coupled with a more autonomous European command, could be linked to NATO, but both would possess a separate command structure. A Euro-Atlantic Defense and Security Identity, which could be joined by as many Central and Eastern European states as are interested, could then be backed by a more concerted system of overlapping NATO, European Union, and Russian security guarantees. A more authentic U.S.-Russian entente, going *beyond* mere power balancing and consultation as has been outlined by the NATO-Russian Founding Act, could then be symbolized by making Kaliningrad a headquarters of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

In effect, this option would seek to implement the interwar proposal to forge a nonthreatening Baltic–Black Sea confederation, which would be intended, much like the interwar Eastern Locarno, to mediate competing between Germany and the European Union on the one hand and Russia and the Confederation of Independent States (CIS) on the other but backed by overlapping NATO, EU, and Russian guarantees. Should Russia, or other states such as Belarus, seek to break out of the general NATO-EU-Russian accord over the region, states such as Sweden and Austria could join NATO as full members in geostrategic support of states in Central and Eastern Europe.

From a global standpoint, a geohistorical model for U.S.-Russian entente would be the 1716–1731 Anglo-French entente and the formation of the Quadruple Alliance. In this period, Great Britain and France, along with the United Provinces and Austria, attempted to reintegrate Spain into the European Concert, and sought to sustain the peace between England and France over the long term. A contemporary version of Quadruple Alliance would involve U.S.-Russian-European-Japanese entente intended to integrate the People’s Republic of China into a global concert. This would, of course, take place in very different circumstances and use very different means of “strategic leveraging” than the Quadruple Alliance.

Going further back into history, NATO must come to terms with the decision to enlarge the Alliance, after having promised not to do so in 1990, so as not to repeat the mutual imprecations that resulted in the Punic Wars. Following the Kosovo intervention, the Alliance needs likewise to reassure Russia and the EU that it will work cooperatively through the Permanent Joint Council, or a NATO-EU-Russian troika, to resolve emerging crises throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. Last, NATO will need to work collectively to build limited and mutually managed ballistic missile defenses, in order to dispel the perception that, like ancient Athens, Washington intends to build a wall around itself by strengthening both its defensive *and* offensive capabilities, undermining both European and Russian nuclear and ballistic missile deterrents.

Will the post-Cold War era continue steps that can truly transform the very nature of international power relationships? Proponents of NATO enlargement have argued that expansion would take Central Europe “out of history.”³³ Critics argue that NATO enlargement will drag the contemporary global system “back into history.”³⁴ The fundamental risk is that the neo-Kantian NATO alliance, as it aligns with states in defense of republican democracy and global liberalization, may be met with a countervailing neo-Hegelian alliance of Russia, China, and India, among other states that seeks to defend the sovereign rights of states. Such a countervailing alliance can be prevented, if the United States, the European Union, and Japan can continue a process of drawing Russia and India, among other actors, into a concerted relationship vis-à-vis China.

This geohistorical analysis has argued in the tradition of Thucydides that the expansion of an alliance, coupled with significant shifts in alliance formations, as well as the penetration of a rival’s spheres of security and influence, may prove fundamentally destabilizing. If, on the other hand, adding more East European members to NATO was in fact “unavoidable,” then a *very* “different implementation,” as Liska argued in 1962,³⁵ may prevent enlargement from provoking major power conflict, or even preemptive nuclear war.

The dilemma remains that compromise between geohistorical rivals may ultimately prove illusory, if the ramifications of change in the global equipoise of perceived power capabilities and political intent are not thoroughly negotiated, and if a particular state’s waning ability to sustain parity is not compensated. In effect, preventing cycles of major power war similar to those of the classical era—and the challenge of breaking the apparent cycle of global wars of initial challenge and *revanche* since the eighteenth century—means that the United States, Europe, and Japan must attempt to overcome the U.S.-Russian land-sea dichotomy through an overt, empathetic, and global engagement.

NOTES

1. See Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, “Alliances and the Preservation of the Postwar Peace: Weighing the Contribution” in *The Long Postwar Peace*, ed. Charles W. Kegley Jr. (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), pp. 275–277.

2. Morris J. Blachman and Donald J. Puchala discuss Liska's early work of the 1960s in their chapter, "When Empires Meet: The Long Peace in Long-Term Perspective," but there is no mention of his later and more significant work written during the 1970s and 1980s. See Charles W. Kegley Jr., ed., *The Long Postwar Peace*. Among other works, George Liska's *Russia and the Road to Appeasement* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1982) deserves a reread following Soviet collapse, the latter possibility clearly foreseen by Liska in his reference to Andrei Amalrik's *Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970). See *Russia and the Road to Appeasement*, p. xiii.

3. See note no. 11, this chapter.

4. Liska distinguishes between "evolution as progression in time, which, interrupted by regressions, links the crests of cyclical fluctuations, and progress, as a straight line to and beyond the present that denotes a qualitative or categorical change of a kind, which authentic, would consign formerly recurrent patterns to antiquarian interest." For Liska, for true progress to occur, the nature of power would have change *qualitatively*. George Liska, *Ways of Power* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 339.

5. Center for Political and Strategic Studies, "Open Letter to the President," *Focus* 4, no. 5 (July 1997).

6. Hall Gardner, *Surviving the Millennium* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), p. 27.

7. George Liska, *Nations in Alliance* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 12.

8. Gardner, pp. 7–26. In the latter work, five dimensional double containment refers to tacit U.S.-Soviet collaboration in containing the power capabilities of states that might *ultimately* "threaten" either U.S. or Soviet/Russian interests, first Germany, then Japan, China, secondary Eurasian rimland states, and finally the peripheral states of Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

9. Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, p. 36.

10. See George Liska, *Quest for Equilibrium* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1977), pp. 6–7.

11. Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, p. 30. The emphasis is mine.

12. Necessarily so in Liska's view. "Parity," "intervention," and "balance of power" are all "fruitfully metaphysical" notions. See Liska, *Quest for Equilibrium*, p. 212.

13. Gardner, pp. 20–26. See note no. 7 this chapter.

14. See Hall Gardner, "The Genesis of NATO Enlargement and of War 'over' Kosovo" in Hall Gardner, ed., *Central and Southeastern Europe in Transition* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000).

15. Support for the Mamertines was not entirely accepted by the Roman Senate, as the latter had a reputation of disloyalty, as offenders of *fides*. After the 264 B.C. capture of Agrigentum, Carthage may have offered a peace treaty on advantageous terms, but was rejected by an expansionist Rome. See William V. Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327–70 BC* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 187.

16. For the text of the treaties, see Francois Decret, *Carthage ou l'empire de la mer* (Editions du Seuil, 1977).

17. For analysis of the origins of the war and the proposed alliance treaty, see Arthur M. Eckstein, *Senate and General* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p. 79, n. 21 and *passim*.

18. In 1654, the Cossacks of the Ukraine swore allegiance to the tsar of Muscovy in the town of Pereyaslav in an agreement that the Cossacks understood to be bilateral, but which for the Russians meant the annexation of the Ukraine. So important a trauma is

this event for Ukrainians that a special ceremony was held in the same town in 1992 to formally renounce the 1654 agreement and all its implications.

19. See Derek McKay and H.M. Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648–1815* (London and New York: Longman, 1983), p. 95 and passim.

20. J.S. Corbett, *England in the Seven Years War*, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, 1907), Vol. 2, p. 185.

21. Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Diplomacy of the American Revolution* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1935/1957), pp. 17–18.

22. Stephen M. Walt, *Revolution and War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 62–74.

23. A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 311–315, 320–321, 341, 346.

24. Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 17–49.

25. This point corrects the analogy made to the interwar Little Entente made in my book, *Surviving the Millennium: American Global Strategy, Collapse of the Soviet Empire, and the Question of Peace* (Westport and London: Praeger, 1994), p. 50.

26. This view contrasts with that of another historical system or “long cycle” theorist, Immanuel Wallerstein. See *The Politics of the World-Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 65–68. For critiques, see Joshua S. Goldstein, *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988); and William R. Thompson, *On Global War* (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1988). For a comparative historical systems view of the Chinese expansion and contraction, see Hall Gardner, “China and the World in the New Millennium,” *Journal of the Institute of Asian Studies*, Special Issue, 17, no. 2, March 2000 Institute of Asian Studies Chemmancherry, Sholinganallur Chennai, 600 119 India; see also Centre de recherches sur les Etudes Asiatiques. http://hometown.aol.com/wignesh/4china_and_international_relation.htm. Both versions were edited by T. Wignesan.

27. For details, see Hall Gardner, “NATO, Russia, and Eastern European Security: Beyond the Interwar Analogy” in *NATO Looks East*, ed. Piotr Dutkiewicz and Robert J. Jackson, Committee on Atlantic Studies (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998). See also Hall Gardner, “The Military Integration of Eastern Europe: Toward an Eastern Locarno?” in *Defense: Next Step in European Integration? Cicero Paper*, 1, 1996, pp. 7–28.

28. See Liska’s comments dealing with the superficial similarity between NATO’s enlargement proposals and the Locarno formula, in George Liska, *The Restoration of Politics* (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), p. 17. See also George Liska, *Return to the Heartland and the Rebirth of the Old Order* (Arlington and Prague: FPI/IIP, 1994).

29. Liska’s argument in regard to developing conjoint U.S.-Soviet-Russian space-based Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) systems still appears valid in regard to conjoint U.S.-Russian BMD systems today and even more so following the Soviet fall from “superpower” status). See “The Challenge of SDI: Preemptive Diplomacy or Preventive War” in Foreign Policy Institute, SAIS Papers in International Affairs, *SDI and U.S. Foreign Policy*, No. 15, Boulder and London: Westview Press/ Foreign Policy Institute, 1987, pp. 57–58.

30. George Liska, *Ways of Power*, p. 8.

31. Hall Gardner, *Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia, and the Future of NATO* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), p. x.

32. Hall Gardner, *Toward Separate—But Not Separable—European and Euro-Atlantic Commands*, ed. Marcel van Herpen and Hall Gardner (Maastricht: Cicero Foundation Press, 1999). See also an earlier version of the paper, entitled “NATO Enlargement: Toward a Separate Euro-Atlantic Command,” published by the Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO (CEERN), <http://www.fas.org/man/nato/ceern/index.html>.

33. Ambassador Robert Hunter, “Enlarging NATO: Reckless or Requisite?” (USIA: US Foreign Policy Agenda, October 1997).

34. John Lewis Gaddis, “What History Teaches about Grand Strategy,” paper prepared for the National Defense University symposium, “Strategy and the Formulation of National Security Policy” (Chevy Chase, MD: Center for Political and Strategic Studies, October 7, 1997); Michael Mandelbaum, “NATO Expansion: A Bridge to the Nineteenth Century” (Chevy Chase, MD: Center for Political and Strategic Studies, June 1997); see also: <http://www.cpss.org>.

35. Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, p. 12.